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Abstract
Mutual fund managers can outperform the market by picking stocks or timing the
market successfully. Previous work has estimated picking and timing skill, assuming
that each manager is endowed with a fixed amount of each and found some evidence
of picking skills and little evidence of timing skills among successful managers. This
paper estimates skill separately in booms and recessions and finds that the extent to
which managers focus on stock picking or market timing fluctuates with the state of the
economy. Stock picking is more prevalent in booms, while market timing dominates in
recessions. We use this finding to develop a new methodology for detecting managerial
skill. The results suggest that some but not all managers have skill. We describe the
characteristics of the skilled managers and show that skilled managers significantly
outperform the market.
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An enormous literature asks whether investment managers add value for their clients and
if so, how. One way to answer this question is to decompose fund performance into stock-
picking ability and market-timing ability. Previous work has estimated picking and timing
skills implicitly assuming that each manager is endowed with a fixed amount of each skill.
But stock picking and market timing are not talents one is born with. They are the result
of time spent working, analyzing data. Like workers in other jobs, fund managers may
choose to focus on different tasks at different points in time. This simple idea leads us
to re-estimate fund manager skill in a way that allows its nature to change, depending on
economic conditions. Our results show that successful managers pick stocks well in booms
and time the market well in recessions. This suggests that skills such as stock picking and
market timing are not distinct and permanent, but instead reflect a cognitive ability that
can be applied in different ways depending on the market environment. As a financial web
site ZeroHedge writes: “It is hard for a portfolio manager to focus on the nuances of stock
selection when the prospects of a U.S. recession keep rising. . . . Simply put, the macro is
overwhelming the micro.”1
Understanding exactly how managers add value for their clients is important because
a large and growing fraction of individual investors delegate their portfolio management
to professional investment managers.2 Yet, a significant body of evidence finds that the
average actively managed fund does not outperform passive investment strategies, net of
fees, and after controlling for differences in systematic risk exposure. Instead, there is a
small subset of funds that persistently outperform. Most previous work has argued that this
1Published on September 25, 2011.
2In 1980, 48% of U.S. equity was directly held by individuals – as opposed to being held through interme-
diaries; by 2007, that fraction was down to 21.5% (French (2008), Table 1). At the end of 2008, $9.6 trillion
was invested with such intermediaries in the U.S. Of all investment in domestic equity mutual funds, about
85% was actively managed (2009 Investment Company Factbook).
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outperformance comes from stock picking and not market timing. Our results suggest that
the reason previous studies failed to detect market- timing ability is because it is typically
displayed only in recessions, which are a small fraction of the sample periods. Once we
condition on the state of the economy, we find that most skilled managers exhibit both
types of skill: Those who are good stock-pickers in booms are also good market-timers in
recessions.
The fact that only a subset of managers add value makes it important to be able to
identify these skilled managers. Therefore, a second contribution of the paper is to develop
a new measure for detecting managerial skill, that gives more weight to fund manager’s
market-timing ability in recessions and her stock-picking ability in booms. This new measure
predicts performance. We show that a subset of managers with the highest value of our skill
measure significantly outperform the passive benchmarks by 70-90 basis points per year, in
a persistent way.
To measure skill, we construct estimates of stock picking (the covariance of portfolio
weights with the firm-specific component of stock returns) and market timing (the covariance
of portfolio weights with the aggregate component of stock returns) for each firm in each
12-month rolling window. Then, we regress these timing and picking variables on a recession
indicator variable to determine if skills change significantly over the business cycle. We find
that the average fund manager exhibits greater stock-picking ability in booms and a better
market-timing ability in recessions. Moreover, results from quantile regressions show that it
is the most skilled managers that vary the use of their skills most over the business cycle.
This is consistent with the idea that only some managers have skill and it is those managers
who decide how to apply that skill depending on the economic environment. Importantly,
this is not a composition effect. It is the same manager who picks stocks well in booms that
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times the market well in recessions.
Our skill measures allow us to further investigate the nature of this stock-picking and
market-timing skill. First, do managers correctly anticipate the demands of other market
participants or do they acquire information that helps them to forecast market fluctuations
or firm earnings? To answer these questions, we try to distinguish a manager’s ability to
forecast market or firm-specific fundamentals from her ability to forecast market sentiment
(movements in returns that are orthogonal to fundamentals). Therefore, we estimate the
covariance of each fund’s portfolio holdings with an aggregate fundamental shock—the in-
novations in industrial production growth. This covariance measures a manager’s ability to
time the market by increasing (decreasing) her portfolio positions in anticipation of good
(bad) macroeconomic news. We find that this fundamentals-based timing covariance rises
in recessions. Likewise, we also calculate the covariance of a fund’s portfolio holdings with
asset-specific fundamental shocks—the unexpected innovations in earnings. This covariance
measures managers’ ability to pick stocks that subsequently experience high earnings. We
find that this fundamentals-based stock-picking covariance increases in expansions. Figure
1 summarizes our findings.
Not only do we find that managers correctly forecast firm-specific fundamentals in booms
and market fundamentals in recessions, these results are even stronger than those in which
timing and picking are based on stock market information. Thus, another contribution of
the paper is to show that skilled managers are learning about the fundamental strengths and
weaknesses of firms and of the economy and are using that information to time the market
and pick stocks.
Next, we explore several investment strategies managers use to time the market. We find
that, on average, they hold more cash in recessions, their portfolios have lower market betas,
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and they tend to engage in sector rotation by investing more money into defensive industries
in recessions and into cyclical industries in booms. All three results suggest that managers
are actively varying their investment behavior along the business cycle.
We entertain five non-skill-related alternative explanations for our main findings. First,
we consider whether mechanical effects from cyclical fluctuations in means or variances of
stock returns could generate changes in picking and timing measure. After all, expected
stock returns vary with the state of the business cycle (e.g., Ferson and Harvey (1991) and
Dangl and Halling (2011)). Second, we explore the possibility that fund strategies change
because the fund manager changes. Third, we study potential selection effects both at the
fund and the manager level. Fourth, we consider whether various forms of career concerns
might explain our results. Finally, we look at an explanation based on time-varying marginal
utility. None of these alternatives can explain the observed changes in fund portfolios over
the business cycle.
Our findings suggest a new way to construct metrics that would help us to identify skilled
managers. To show that skilled managers exist, we select the top 25 percent of funds in terms
of their stock-picking ability in expansions and show that the same group has significant
market-timing ability in recessions; the remaining funds show no such market-timing ability.
Conversely, we can select the top 25 percent of funds in terms of their market-timing ability
in recessions and show that this same group has significant stock-picking ability in booms.
These top funds produce unconditional fund returns in excess of passive benchmarks. Our
approach is quite different from a typical approach in the literature, which has studied stock
picking and market timing in isolation, unconditional on the state of the economy. The
consensus view from that literature is that there is some evidence of stock-picking ability
among best managers, but little evidence for market timing (e.g., Graham and Harvey (1996),
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Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Wermers (2000) and Kacperczyk and Seru
(2007)). Notable exceptions are Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2008) who find evidence for
market timing using Kalman filtering techniques, and Bollen and Busse (2001) and Elton,
Gruber, and Blake (2011) who find evidence of market timing using higher frequency holdings
data. Our finding that some managers have skill is consistent with a number of recent papers
in the empirical mutual fund literature, e.g., Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2002), Kacperczyk,
Sialm, and Zheng (2005, 2008), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), Christoffersen, Keim, and
Musto (2007), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), Koijen (2010), Baker, Litov, Wachter, and
Wurgler (2010), Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011), Amihud and Goyenko (2011), and Cohen,
Polk, and Silli (2011).
Finally, using hand-collected data, we identify the characteristics of the superior funds
and their managers. They tend to be smaller and more active. By matching fund-level to
manager-level data, we find that these skilled managers are also more likely to attract new
money flows and more likely to depart later in their careers to hedge funds—presumably,
both are market-based reflections of their ability. Finally, we construct a skill index based
on observables and show that it predicts future performance over one-month and one-year
horizons.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 tests the hypothesis that fund
managers’ stock-picking and market-timing skill varies over the business cycle, using the
universe of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds. Section 2 delves more deeply into
how managers pick stocks and time the market. Section 3 considers alternative explanations,
not based on time-varying use of skill. Section 4 uses the paper’s insights to identify a group
of skilled mutual funds in the data and measures their outperformance. Section 5 concludes.
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1 Skill Varies Over Time
We begin by describing our data on active mutual fund managers, their portfolios, and
their returns. We describe our measures of skill and then use the data to estimate them in
booms and recessions. In principle, similar tests could be conducted for hedge funds, other
professional investment managers, or even individual investors.
1.1 Data
Our sample builds upon several data sets. We begin with the Center for Research on Security
Prices (CRSP) survivorship bias-free mutual fund database. The CRSP database provides
comprehensive information about fund returns and a host of other fund characteristics, such
as size (total net assets), age, expense ratio, turnover, and load. Given the nature of our
tests and data availability, we focus on actively managed open-end U.S. equity mutual funds.
We further merge the CRSP data with fund holdings data from Thomson Financial. The
total number of funds in our merged sample is 3477.
In addition, for some of our exercises, we map funds to the names of their managers
using information from CRSP, Morningstar, Nelson’s Directory of Investment Managers,
Zoominfo, and Zabasearch. This mapping results in a sample with 4267 managers. We also
use the CRSP/Compustat stock-level database, which is a source of information on individual
stocks’ returns, market capitalizations, book-to-market ratios, momentum, liquidity, and
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). The aggregate stock market return is the value-
weighted average return of all stocks in the CRSP universe.
We use changes in monthly industrial production, obtained from the Federal Reserve
Statistical Release, as a proxy for aggregate shocks. Industrial production is seasonally
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adjusted. We measure recessions using the definition of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) business cycle dating committee. The start of the recession is the peak
of economic activity and its end is the trough. Our aggregate sample spans 312 months of
data from January 1980 until December 2005, among which 38 are NBER recession months
(12%). We consider several alternative recession indicators and find our results to be robust.3
1.2 Defining measures of skill
Investors who have skill use them to form portfolios that covary with realized returns. If an
investor has skill in timing the market, it means that he holds more of the market portfolio
in periods when the realized market return will be high and holds less when the realized
market return will be low. Similarly, stock-picking ability is the ability to hold more of a
stock in periods when that firm’s realized stock return will be high. To this end, we define
the following measures of skill.
For fund j at time t, T imingj measures how a fund’s holdings of each asset, relative
to the market, covary with the systematic component of the stock return, over the next T
periods:
T imingjt =
1
TN j
Nj∑
i=1
T−1∑
τ=0
(wjit+τ − w
m
it+τ )(βit+τ+1R
m
t+τ+1), (1)
where βi measures the covariance of asset i’s return, R
i, with the market return, Rm, divided
by the variance of the market return. The product of βi and R
m measures the systematic
component of returns of asset i. The time subscripts indicate that the systematic component
3We have confirmed our results using an indicator variable for negative real consumption growth, the
Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), and an indicator variable for the 25% lowest stock market
returns as alternative recession indicators. While its salience makes the NBER indicator a natural benchmark,
the other measures may be available in a more timely manner. Also, the CFNAI has the advantage that it
is a continuous variable, measuring the strength of economic activity. These results are omitted for brevity
but are available from the authors upon request.
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of the return is unknown at the time of portfolio formation. Before the market return rises,
a fund with a high T iming ability overweights assets that have high betas. Likewise, it
underweights assets with high betas in anticipation of a market decline.
Similarly, Pickingjt measures how a fund’s holdings of each stock, relative to the market,
covary with the idiosyncratic component of the stock return:
Pickingjt =
1
N j
Nj∑
i=1
(wjit − w
m
it )(R
i
t+1 − βiR
m
t+1) (2)
A fund with a high Picking ability overweights assets that have subsequently high idiosyn-
cratic returns and underweights assets with low subsequent idiosyncratic returns.
1.3 Main result: Skill is time varying
We begin by testing the main claim of the paper, that skilled investment managers deploy
their skills differently over the business cycle. Our aim is to show that because managers
analyze the aggregate payoff shock in recessions, it allows them to choose portfolio holdings
that covary more with the aggregate shock. Conversely, in expansions, their holdings covary
more with stock-specific information. To this end, we estimate the following regression
model:
Pickingjt = a0 + a1Recessiont + a2X
j
t + ǫ
j
t , (3)
T imingjt = b0 + b1Recessiont + b2X
j
t + ε
j
t , (4)
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where Recessiont is an indicator variable equal to one if the economy in month t is in
recession, as defined by the NBER, and zero otherwise. X is a vector of fund-specific control
variables, including the fund age (natural logarithm of age in years since inception, log(Age)),
the fund size (natural logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars,
log(TNA)), the average fund expense ratio (in percent per year, Expenses), the turnover
rate (in percent per year, Turnover), the percentage flow of new funds (defined as the ratio
of TNAjt − TNA
j
t−1(1 + R
j
t ) to TNA
j
t−1, F low), and the fund load (the sum of front-end
and back-end loads, additional fees charged to the customers to cover marketing and other
expenses, Load). Also included are the fund style characteristics along the size, value, and
momentum dimensions.4 To mitigate the impact of outliers on our estimates, we winsorize
F low and Turnover at the 1% level.
We estimate this and most of our subsequent specifications using pooled (panel) regression
model and calculating standard errors by clustering at the fund and time dimensions. This
approach addresses the concern that the errors, conditional on independent variables, might
be correlated within fund and time dimensions (e.g., Moulton (1986) and Thompson (2009)).
Addressing this concern is especially important in our context since our variable of interest,
Recession, is constant across all fund observations in a given time period. Also, we demean
all control variables so that the constant a0 can be interpreted as the level of the skill variable
in expansions, and a1 indicates how much the variable increases in recessions.
First, we examine the variation in market-timing, T imingjt , and stock-picking ability,
4The size style of a fund is the value-weighted score of its stock holdings’ percentile scores calculated
with respect to their market capitalizations (1 denotes the smallest size percentile; 100 denotes the largest
size percentile). The value style is the value-weighted score of its stock holdings’ percentile scores calculated
with respect to their book-to-market ratios (1 denotes the smallest B/M percentile; 100 denotes the largest
B/M percentile). The momentum style is the value-weighted score of a fund’s stock holdings’ percentile
scores calculated with respect to their past twelve-month returns (1 denotes the smallest return percentile;
100 denotes the largest return percentile). These style measures are similar in spirit to those defined in
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005).
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Pickingjt , defined in equations (1) and (2). The stock betas, βi, utilized in T iming and
Picking, are computed using the twelve-month rolling-window regressions of stock excess
returns on market excess returns. Table 1 presents the results.
Columns 1 and 2 show that the average market-timing ability across funds increases
significantly in recessions. The increase is 25 percent of a standard deviation of the T iming
measure, which is economically meaningful. Likewise, columns 3 and 4 show that stock-
picking ability deteriorates substantially in recessions. The reduction in recessions is about
20 percent of a standard deviation of the Picking measure. In sum, we observe strong
differences in average skills across market conditions.
1.4 Do all managers have time-varying skill?
Since markets have to clear, not everyone can outperform the market. Fama and French
(2010) have used such adding-up constraint to argue that the average actively managed
mutual fund cannot outperform passively managed funds. Therefore, the average fund cannot
be a profitable stock-picker.5 Our claim is not that all funds outperform, or even that the
average fund outperforms. We only claim that there is a subset of funds with skilled managers
who deliver valuable services to their clients, before fees, at the expense of all other investors
(unskilled fund and non-fund investors). A second part of the Fama and French argument is
that the R2 of a regression of the aggregate mutual fund return on the market return is close
to one. In other words, when we average across active funds, that average fund is passive.
Our conclusions are consistent with this finding, because it does not condition investment
strategies on the state of the business cycle and does not preclude the existence of a subset
5Savov (2010) argues that the same is not true for market timing, since investors in index funds capture
less than the buy-and-hold returns of index funds through their dynamic trading strategies.
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of skilled managers.
If we believe that there is a subset of skilled managers and that these skilled managers
vary the way they use skill over the business cycle, then we should see most of the time
variation in the use of skill among the most skilled managers. We test this prediction using
quantiles of the cross-sectional fund distribution. Our hypothesis is that the distribution of
picking and timing skills should be more sensitive to recession variable in the right tail than
at the median. We evaluate this hypothesis formally by estimating the models in (3) and
(4) using quantile regressions. We consider three different quantiles: 50 (median), 75, and
95. Table 2 presents the results.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the effect of business cycle on skill is much
stronger for extremely successful fund managers, residing in quantile 95, than for the median
fund. The effect is statistically significant and economically strong, both for stock picking
and market timing. For example, for market timing the effect of recession for extremely
successful managers is about four times larger than that for the median manager (0.251 vs.
0.059). A similar comparison for stock picking returns about two times magnitude difference
(-0.173 vs. -0.084). In sum, we conclude that the effect of market conditions on skill matters
more for top-performing managers, which is consistent with the view that only a subset of
fund managers hones skills.
1.5 The same managers exhibit both skills
One possible explanation for the findings reported thus far is that some managers have timing
ability and others have picking ability, but that no managers both pick stocks and time the
market well. To show that some managers are good at both tasks, we test the prediction
that the same mutual funds that exhibit stock-picking ability in expansions display market-
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timing ability in recessions. We first identify funds with superior stock-picking ability in
expansions: For all expansion months, we select all fund-month observations that are in the
highest 25% of the Pickingjt distribution (equation 2). We then form an indicator variable
Skill Picking (SPj ∈ {0, 1}) that is equal to 1 for the 25% of funds (884 funds) with the
highest fraction of observations (months) in that top group , relative to the total number of
observations for that fund (months in expansions). Then, we estimate the following pooled
regression model, separately for expansions and recessions:
Abilityjt = c0 + c1SP
j
t + c2X
j
t + ǫ
j
t , (5)
where Ability denotes either T iming or Picking. X is a vector of previously defined control
variables. The coefficient of interest is c1.
In Table 3, column 3, we confirm that SP funds are significantly better at picking stocks in
expansions, after controlling for fund characteristics. This is true by construction. The main
point is that these same SP funds are on average better at market timing in recessions. This
result is evident from positive coefficient on SP in column 2, that is statistically significant
at the 5% level. Finally, the funds in SP do not exhibit superior market-timing ability
in expansions (column 1) nor superior stock-picking ability in recessions (column 4), which
validates the point that SP funds switch strategies.
2 How Do Funds Outperform The Market?
This section explores in greater detail how managers time the market and pick stocks, opening
up the black box of fund outperformance. First, it looks at whether picking and timing
are based on fundamental analysis or not. Second, to further explain how funds time the
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market in recessions, we show that they significantly increase their cash holdings, reduce
their holdings of high-beta stocks, and tilt their portfolios towards more defensive sectors.
Lastly, it explores alternative ways of measuring business cycles and skills.
2.1 Is skill from fundamental analysis?
The finding that some fund managers have skill raises questions about the nature of this
skill. Is it an ability to forecast changes in market or firms fundamentals or rather some
intuitive understanding of market psychology (sentiment)? To isolate the part of skill that
comes from an ability to analyze fundamentals, we construct two new additional measures
of skill, Ftiming and Fpicking, where the first F stands for fundamentals-based timing and
picking skills. While timing and picking measure the covariance of a fund’s portfolio with
market and firm-specific returns, Ftiming measures the covariance of the portfolio with a
measure of real economic performance (market fundamentals) and Fpicking measures the
covariance with firm earnings (firm-specific fundamentals).
Suppose that the time-t return on stock i depends on an aggregate shock at and a stock-
specific shock si,t. Asset i’s loading on the aggregate shock is bi and the mean return is
µi:
Ri,t = µi + biat + si,t, i ∈ {1, · · · , N} (6)
where the shocks a and si,t are mean-zero and mutually independent ∀ i ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
We define a fund’s fundamentals-based market timing skill, Ftiming, as the covariance
between its portfolio weights in deviation from the market portfolio weights, wji − w
m
i , and
13
the aggregate payoff shock, a, over a T -period horizon, averaged across assets:
Ftimingjt =
1
TN j
Nj∑
i=1
T−1∑
τ=0
(wjit+τ − w
m
it+τ )(at+τ+1), (7)
where N j is the number of individual assets held by fund j. The subscript τ + t on the
portfolio weights and the subscript τ+t+1 on the aggregate shock signify that the aggregate
shock is unknown at the time of portfolio formation. Relative to the market, a fund with
a high Ftiming overweights assets that have high (low) sensitivity to the aggregate shock
in anticipation of a positive (negative) aggregate shock realization and underweights assets
with a low (high) sensitivity. Put differently, in times when they learn that a is likely to
be high, skilled managers who do fundamental analysis should hold more risky assets whose
returns are increasing in a. Ftiming is closely related to measures of market-timing ability,
but it extracts the part of skill that is due to fundamental market analysis.
When skilled investment managers use their skill to analyze stock-specific payoff shocks,
si, their analysis allows them to choose portfolios that covary with si. We define fundamentals-
based stock picking skill, Fpicking, which measures the covariance of a fund’s portfolio
weights of each stock, relative to the market, with the stock-specific shock, si:
Fpickingjt =
1
N j
Nj∑
i=1
(wjit − w
m
it )(sit+1) (8)
How well the manager can choose portfolio weights in anticipation of future asset-specific
payoff shocks is closely linked to her stock-picking ability. But in contrast to Picking,
Fpicking extracts the part of skill that is due to analysis of fundamental determinants of
firms’ payoffs.
We now examine how the fundamentals-based skill measures vary over the business cycle.
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In the construction of Ftiming, we proxy for the aggregate payoff shock a with the innovation
in log industrial production growth.6 A time series for Ftimingjt is obtained by computing
the covariance of the innovations and each fund j’s portfolio weights using twelve-month
rolling windows. Our hypothesis is that Ftiming should be higher in recessions, which
means that the coefficient on Recession, should be positive. Our estimates appear in Table
4. Column 1 shows the results for a univariate regression. The intercept is not different from
zero, implying that funds’ portfolios do not comove with future macroeconomic information
in expansion. In contrast, in recessions, Ftiming increases. The increase amounts to ten
percent of a standard deviation of Ftiming. It is measured precisely, with a t-statistic of
3. To remedy the possibility of a bias in the coefficient due to omitted fund characteristics
correlated with recession times, we turn to a multivariate regression in column 2. The slope
coefficient of recession remains largely unaffected by the inclusion of the control variables.
Next, we repeat our analysis using funds’ reliance on stock-specific fundamental informa-
tion (Fpicking) as a dependent variable. Following equation (8), Fpicking is computed in
each month t as a cross-sectional covariance across the assets between the fund’s portfolio
weights and firm-specific earnings shocks. To form the latter, we regress earnings per share
in a given quarter on earnings per share in the previous quarter (earnings are reported quar-
terly), and use the residual from this regression.7,8 In the model, the fund’s portfolio holdings
and its returns covary more with subsequent firm-specific shocks in expansions. Therefore,
our hypothesis is that Fpicking should fall in recessions. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 show
6We regress log industrial production growth at t+1 on log industrial production growth in month t, and
use the residual from this regression. Because industrial production growth is nearly i.i.d, the same results
obtain if we simply use the log change in industrial production between t and t+ 1.
7Suppose month t and t+ 3 are end-of-quarter months. Then Fpicking in months t, t+ 1, and t+ 2 are
computed using portfolio weights from month t and earnings surprises from month t+ 3.
8We have verified that the firm-specific earnings shocks are uncorrelated with the aggregate earnings
shocks. The median correlation across stocks is below 0.01, with a cross-sectional standard deviation of 0.28.
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that the average Fpicking across funds is positive in expansions and substantially lower
in recessions. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. It is also economically
significant: Fpicking decreases by approximately ten percent of one standard deviation.
Overall, the data support the model’s prediction that portfolio holdings are more sensitive
to aggregate shocks in recessions and more sensitive to firm-specific shocks in expansions.
2.2 Cash holdings and market timing
To get further insight into why the T iming and Ftiming measures increase in recessions,
we conduct several other exercises. First, we ask whether managers actively change their
cash holdings in recessions. Cash is measured either as Reported Cash, from CRSP, or
Implied Cash, backed out from fund size and its equity holdings. Table 5 shows a higher
cash position in recessions than in expansions. In expansions, funds hold about 5% of their
portfolio in cash. In recessions, the fraction of their holdings in cash rises by about 0.3% for
the Reported Cash measure and by about 3% for the Implied Cash measure. Both increases
are statistically significant, and each represents a change of about ten percent of a standard-
deviation. We also investigate the month-over-month change in the Implied Cash position.
In recessions, cash holdings increase by 0.5%. The effect is modest, but measured precisely.
In sum, one way in which funds lower their portfolio beta in recessions is to increase their
cash positions.
2.3 Portfolio beta and sector rotation
The second question we ask is whether fund managers invest in lower-beta stocks in reces-
sions. For each individual stock, we compute the beta (from twelve-month rolling-window
regressions). Based on the individual stock holdings of each mutual fund, we construct the
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funds’ (value-weighted) equity betas. Columns 7 and 8 of Table 5 show that this beta is 1.11
in expansions and 0.99 in recessions; the 0.12 difference has a t-statistic of 4.5. This means
that funds not only keep more cash in recessions, they also hold different types of stocks,
namely lower-beta stocks.
Finally, we investigate whether funds change their portfolio allocations towards defensive
sectors over the business cycle. Table 6 shows that, in recessions, funds increase their portfo-
lio weights (relative to those in the market portfolio) in low-beta sectors such as Healthcare,
Non-Durables (which includes Food and Tobacco), Wholesale, and Utilities. They reduce
their portfolio weights (relative to those in the market portfolio) in high-beta sectors such as
Telecom, Business Equipment and Services, Manufacturing, Energy, and Durables. Hence,
funds engage in sector rotation over the course of the business cycle in a way consistent with
market timing.
2.4 Fund skill or fund manager skill?
Is skill embodied in the manager or does it come from the employee human capital and the
organizational setup the fund provides that manager? To answer this question, we follow
a manager over time, even as (s)he switches funds. This allows us to investigate to what
extent our results reflect skill at the level of the fund versus at the level of the manager.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 show how Ftiming and Fpicking change in recessions when the
unit of observation is the manager. The results without the control variables are similar to
the results with controls, which we present. The table indicates significantly higher Ftiming
and significantly lower Fpicking in recessions. The magnitudes of the recession effect are
similar at the manager level as they were at the fund level. In columns 3 and 4, we add
manager-fixed effects to control for any unobserved manager characteristics that may drive
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the results. The results remain essentially unchanged. We conclude that our results hold
both at the fund level and at the manager level.
2.5 Skill measures: Robustness
This section explores various robustness tests to our measures of fund manager skill. The
first two exercises address measurement issues in Ftiming and Fpicking, the measures of
fundamental-analysis skill. The third one explores another metric of market timing.
Industrial production vs. aggregate economic activity. Our measure of fundamen-
tal timing utilizes industrial production innovations to proxy for the aggregate payoff shock.
Industrial production is useful because it is available monthly, as opposed to most other
macro-economic variables such as GDP, which are released only quarterly. But it has a
possible limitation that it does not cover non-industrial economic activity, which accounts
for a large share of economic activity in the U.S. To explore the importance of this issue for
our measure, we compute an alternative Ftiming2 measure in which the aggregate shock
is proxied by surprises in non-farm employment growth, another salient monthly macroe-
conomic variable, instead of industrial production growth. The effect of recessions on the
fundamentals-based timing ability listed in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 is four times larger
and even more statistically significant than the original result.
Unexpected earnings and seasonal fluctuations. In our measure of stock-specific
skill we use shocks to firm earnings from an AR(1) process as stock-specific shocks. But
firm earnings might not be well described by a one-quarter AR(1) process. We allow for
seasonality or more lags in the dynamic earnings process by using data one year earlier to
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forecast earnings and define what constitutes an earnings surprise. To implement this, we
compute an alternative Fpicking2 measure in which earnings surprises are defined as the
residual from a regression of earnings per share in a given year on earnings per share in that
same quarter one year earlier (instead of one quarter earlier), as in Bernard and Thomas
(1989). The effect of recessions on the fundamentals-based stock-picking ability listed in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 is even more negative (-0.89 vs -0.68) and just as statistically
significant as the original result.
Market timing could also be captured by an R2. In some settings, the comovement
of a portfolio with a shock is not measured using a covariance of the portfolio weights with
the shock, but via the R2 of a fund-level CAPM regression:
Rjt = α
j + βjRmt + σ
j
εε
j
t . (9)
The R2 of this regression measures how the funds’ excess returns covary with the market
excess return. In contrast, the T iming variable measures how funds’ portfolio weights covary
with the market excess return. The results in columns 5 and 6 show that the average
R2 across all funds rises from 77% in expansions to 80% in recessions, an effect that is
statistically significant. In summary, using other measures of skills, we continue to conclude
that recessions are times when fund managers use their skill to analyze aggregate market
conditions. This makes their portfolio choices and therefore their fund returns more sensitive
to changes in market returns.
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3 Alternative Explanations
This section explores whether our time-varying covariance results could arise from other
effects unrelated to managerial skill. Specifically, we explore whether it could be a mechanical
effect, a composition effect or a result of time-varying incentives.
This estimation employs a difference-in-differences approach. Since the average investor
must hold the market portfolio in order for the market to clear, whatever the average manager
in our sample holds must be the mirror image of what the investors not in our sample (non-
fund investors) hold. Thus, anything that affects all investors equally cannot result in any
portfolio effects. That would mean that markets do not clear. So, we are implicitly looking
at differences in the portfolios of fund versus non-fund investors. And furthermore, we are
interested in how those portfolio differences change in booms and recessions. An alternative
mechanism that just generates a higher picking measure in booms or timing measure in
recessions will not generate our results unless it affects funds more than non-funds. The
alternatives explored below cannot generate the diff-in-diff results we have documented.
3.1 Stock price patterns generate mechanical effects
The first alternative is that our results at the mutual fund level arise mechanically from the
properties of returns at the stock level. To rule this out, we generate artificial return data
for a panel of 1000 stocks and the same number of periods as our sample. We assume that
stock returns follow a CAPM with time-varying parameters. The mean and volatility of the
market return, the idiosyncratic volatility, and the cross-sectional standard deviation of the
alpha and beta are chosen to match the properties of stock-level data. Using a simulation for
500 funds, we verify that mechanical mutual fund strategies cannot reproduce the observed
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features of fund returns. The mechanical strategies include an equally weighted portfolio of
75 (or 50 or 100) randomly chosen stocks by all funds, half the funds choosing 75 random
stocks from the top half of the alpha distribution and the other half 75 stocks from the
bottom half of the alpha distribution, or similar strategies where half the funds pick from
the top half of the total return or the beta distribution with the other half of funds choosing
from the bottom half. None of these strategies generates higher market timing measures in
recessions and higher stock picking readings in expansions.
3.2 Composition effects
A second possible explanation for our results is that each fund pursues a fixed strategy,
but the composition of funds changes over the business cycle in such a way as to make the
average fund strategy change. Such composition effects could come from changes in the set
of active funds, from changes in the size of each of those funds, or from entry and exit of
fund managers. We explore each in turn.
Fund-level composition effects First, we redo our results with fund-fixed effects to
control for changes in the set of active funds. Including fixed effects in a regression model is
a standard response to sample selection concerns. The results are qualitatively similar and
slightly stronger quantitatively. For example, the coefficient of Fpicking is equal to −0.92
(as opposed to −0.70 before), while the coefficient of Ftiming equals 0.010 (as opposed to
0.011 before). Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level of statistical significance. The
results are omitted for brevity.
Next, we consider if this is a composition effect related to fund size. It could be that the
average mutual fund changes strategy over the business cycle only because relative fund size
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changes. Some fund managers might become more successful in recessions and manage larger
funds, while others become successful in booms and accumulate more assets in those times.
But our results showing that the same funds that do well at stock picking in expansions are
good at market timing in recessions (Table 3) is incompatible with this explanation. And
furthermore, this effect should also be picked up with a fund fixed-effect. Yet, when we
include fund fixed effects, our cyclical skill results persist.
Manager-level composition effects Similarly, we can rule out the alternative expla-
nation that the composition of managers changes over the cycle; recall our manager-level
results with manager-level fixed effects as explanatory variables (columns 3 and 4 of Table
7). If a selection/composition effect drives the increase in Ftiming in recessions, we should
not find any effect from recession once we control for fixed effects. However, our results show
that all our manager-level results survive the inclusion of manager-fixed effects.
More specifically, if we think that the composition of managers is changing over the busi-
ness cycle through entry and exit of managers, we should see some difference in observable
manager characteristics.9 However, when we examine manager characteristics over the busi-
ness cycle, we find no systematic differences in age, experience, or educational background
of fund managers in recessions versus expansions.
9Our data do show that outside labor market options of investment fund managers deteriorate in reces-
sions. Not only do assets under management–and therefore managerial compensation–shrink, managers are
also more likely to get fired or demoted. There is a smaller incidence of promotion to a larger mutual fund
in a different fund family, a higher incidence of demotion to a smaller mutual fund in a different fund family,
and a lower incidence of departure to a hedge fund. Results are available on request.
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3.3 Career concerns
In the previous section, we considered the possibility that the composition of funds changes.
Now, we consider the possibility that the behavior or funds changes over the business cycle,
but not because of attention allocation. One reason for the change in behavior might be
because of cyclical career concerns.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show that career concerns give managers an incentive to
herd. This pressure is strongest on young managers. It would seem logical that the concern
for being fired would be greatest in recessions; in fact, our data bear this out as mentioned
in footnote 9. What does herding imply for picking and timing? Stock picking is an activity
that skilled managers might do very differently: Some might analyze pharmaceutical stocks
and others energy stocks. But market timing is something that managers would expect other
skilled managers to do in the same way at the same time. It is better suited to herding. So,
according to this alternative explanation, market timing in recessions arises because of the
stronger pressure on young managers to herd.
In order to investigate this hypothesis, we estimate portfolio dispersion–a measure of
the inverse of herding–in recessions and booms. Our measure of dispersion is the sum of
squared deviations of fund j’s portfolio weight in asset i at time t, wjit, from the average
fund’s portfolio weight in asset i at time t, wmit , summed over all assets held by fund j, N
j :
Portfolio Dispersionjt =
Nj∑
i=1
(
wjit − w
m
it
)2
. (10)
If we regress this dispersion measure on a regression indicator variable and a constant, the
recession coefficient is 0.347 and is significant at the 5% confidence level. Controlling for the
fund characteristics listed in Table 1 changes this estimate by less than a percent. Thus,
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instead of finding more portfolio herding in recessions, we find the opposite, more cross-
sectional portfolio dispersion.
It is worth noting that we do find that manager age is positive and significantly related
to the fund’s portfolio dispersion metric, meaning that younger managers are more likely to
herd. This confirms the findings of Chevalier and Ellison (1999) in our data set. But this
herding is weaker in recessions, not stronger.
Since we just showed that recessions are times when managers are more likely to deviate
from the pack, one might be tempted to construct a story whereby career concerns are
actually stronger in expansions instead of recessions. But if that is true, then there should
be an interaction effect: Younger managers should be more likely to hold portfolios with
low dispersion in booms. In recessions, their portfolio dispersion should increase by more.
Conversely, older managers’ portfolio dispersion should change less over the cycle. This
suggests that when we regress portfolio dispersion on recession, age of the manager and the
interaction of recession and age, the interaction term should have a negative sign (dispersion
for older managers decreases less in recessions). Instead, we find a significantly positive
interaction effect. The coefficient of the interaction term equals 0.40 (with a standard error
or 0.08). If instead of portfolio dispersion, we look at the dispersion in funds’ portfolio betas,
the coefficient of the interaction term is −0.047 with standard error of 0.038, which is not
statistically different from zero.
In sum, the results do not support the hypothesis that cyclical changes in skill are driven
by cyclical changes in career concerns. While labor market considerations may be important
to understand many aspects of the behavior of mutual fund managers, the above argument
suggests that they cannot account for the specific patterns we document.
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3.4 Time-varying marginal utility
Two recent studies link fund performance to business-cycle variation. Glode (2011) argues
that funds outperform in recessions because their investors’ marginal utility is highest in
such periods. While complementary to our explanation–and a good explanation for why
households choose to delegate their portfolio to mutual funds–his work remains silent on what
strategies investment managers pursue to achieve this differential performance. Similarly,
Kosowski (2006) shows that fund performance varies over the business cycle but he does not
distinguish between the sources of skill as we do here.
4 Identifying Skilled Managers
The time variation in skill we have detected can now be used to form an indicator of who
the skilled managers are.
4.1 Why not judge managers only on performance?
The most obvious way to assess skill is to look at a fund’s average return. To avoid confusing
risky investment with skilled investment, we need to adjust returns for risk. The difficulty is
that measuring risk in the presence of private information is nearly impossible. Information
that helps a manager to forecast a market’s future return, makes the return less uncertain
to the manager. By its nature, information reduces uncertainty and resolves risk. But
that means we can only accurately judge a manager’s risk-adjusted returns if we know
what information he has. Therefore, it is useful to couple performance measures with other
measures of skill that do not rely on one’s ability to accurately measure risk.
To see more clearly what the problem is, imagine that a fund manager’s portfolio return
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is a normally-distributed random variable f ∼ N(µ, σ2). Now, suppose the fund manager
does research that uncovers information about his future return. He sees an unbiased but
noisy signal, s = f + e, where the signal noise e is also normally distributed s ∼ N(0, η2).
According to Bayes’ law, the manager’s updated best estimate of his portfolio return, condi-
tional on seeing his signal is E[f |s] = (µσ−2+ sη−2)/(σ−2+η−2). But more importantly, the
variance of that estimate is V [f |s] = 1/(σ−2+η−2). For any finite signal variance η2 ∈ [0,∞)
this variance is always less than the prior variance: V [f |s] < σ2. Suppose that fund perfor-
mance is judged by a Sharpe ratio. The econometrician, who is unaware of the manager’s
information, estimates this Sharpe ratio as the prior expected return, divided by the prior
standard deviation: µ/σ. But the manager’s true Sharpe ratio is the one conditional on
his information: E[f |s]/V [f |s]1/2. By the law of iterated expectations, E[E[f |s]] = µ. But
we know that V [f |s]1/2 < σ. Thus, the true Sharpe ratio of the manager is systematically
higher than what the econometrician estimates.
Not only will the conditional variance be lower, by the same token, the conditional covari-
ance of that return with the market return will also be reduced when the manager observes
his signal. Suppose that the portfolio return at time t is ft = α + βr
m
t + νt, where r
m
t is
the time-t market return and νt ∼ N(0, φ
2). The covariance of the portfolio return and
the market return is βV ar[rm]. But the manager’s signal about his portfolio return is also
informative about the market return. Specifically, (s − α)/β is an unbiased, normally dis-
tributed signal about rm. Conditioning on this signal will lower the uncertainty about the
market return: V ar[rm|s] < V ar[rm]. If the true conditional variance is lower, the true con-
ditional covariance is lower as well. The same logic explains why the conditional covariances
in a multi-factor model would be overestimated as well. Thus, an econometrician who uses
a factor model to measure performance and does not account for the manager’s superior
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information, will over-estimate risk and under-estimate the true risk-adjusted return.10
Whether he measures skill with a Sharpe ratio or an alpha, the econometrician’s estimate
of skill is downward biased for truly skilled managers. Of course, ultimately we also want to
know what the manager’s realized portfolio return is, so that we know if picking and timing
are generating outperformance. But also considering measures of picking and timing ability
is a way to avoid relying solely on biased measures of risk.
4.2 Funds that switch strategies earn higher returns
Instead of using performance metrics to select fund managers, we exploit the prediction
that skilled managers display market-timing ability in recessions and stock-picking ability
in expansions to develop a new skill metric. First, we show that this metric is correlated
with performance. Then we show that, unlike performance alone, this measure of skill is
persistent and can therefore predict future returns.
If skilled funds switch between market timing and stock picking, then these strategy
switchers should outperform the unskilled funds both in recessions and in expansions. Table
3 showed that there exists a set of SP funds that have high stock-picking skill in booms
and that also have market-timing skill in recessions. Table 9 compares the unconditional
performance of these SP funds to that of all other funds. After controlling for various fund
characteristics, the CAPM, three-factor, and four-factor alphas are 70-90 basis points per
year higher for the SP portfolio, a difference that is statistically and economically significant.
The existence of skilled mutual funds with cyclical investment strategies is a robust
result. First, the results survive if we change the cutoff levels for the inclusion in the SP
10See Koijen (2010) for a detailed exploration of this argument, as well as earlier versions of this argument
in Ferson and Schadt (1996), Ferson and Harvey (1999), and Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2008).
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portfolio. Second, we find that the top 25% Fpicking funds (as opposed to the top 25%
Picking funds) in expansions also have higher Ftiming in recessions and that they earn
higher unconditional alphas. Third, we verify our results using Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1997)’s definitions of market timing (CT) and stock picking (CS). Finally, we
reverse the sort to show that funds in the top 25% of market-timing ability in recessions
have statistically higher stock-picking ability in expansions and higher unconditional alphas.
All these results are available upon request.
4.3 The characteristics of skilled funds and managers
In Panel A of Table 10, we compare the characteristics of the funds in the Skill-Picking
portfolio to those of funds not included in the portfolio. We note several differences. First,
funds in SP portfolio are younger (by five years on average). Second, they have less wealth
under management (by $400 million), suggestive of decreasing returns to scale at the fund
level. Third, they tend to charge higher expenses (by 0.26% per year), suggesting rent
extraction from customers for the skill they provide. Fourth, they exhibit higher asset
turnover rates (130% per year, versus 80% for other funds), consistent with a more active
management style. Fifth, they receive higher inflows of new assets to manage, presumably
a market-based reflection of their skill. Sixth, the SP funds tend to hold portfolios with
fewer stocks and higher stock-level and industry-level portfolio dispersion. Seventh, their
betas deviate more from their peers, suggesting a strategy with different systematic risk
exposure. Finally, they rely significantly more on aggregate information. Taken together,
fund characteristics, such as age, TNA, expenses, and turnover explain 14% of the variation
in the skill indicator SP (not reported). Including attributes that we could link to skilled
funds, such as stock and industry portfolio dispersion, beta deviation, and Ftiming, increases
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the R2 to 19%. Thus, these findings paint a rough picture of what a typical skilled fund
looks like.
Table 10, Panel B, examines manager characteristics. SP fund managers are 2.6% more
likely to have an MBA, are one year younger, and have 1.7 fewer years of experience. Inter-
estingly, they are much more likely to depart for hedge funds later in their careers, suggesting
that the market judges them to have superior skills.
4.4 Creating a Skill Index
If one is going to use our approach to identify skilled investment managers, it is important
that these managers can be identified in real time, without the benefit of looking at the full
sample of the data. To this end, we construct a Skill Index that is informed by our main
result that the nature of skill and investment strategies change over the business cycle. We
define the Skill Index as a weighted average of T iming and Picking measures, in which the
weights we place on each measure depend on the state of the business cycle:
Skill Indexjt(z) = w(zt)T iming
j
t + (1− w(zt))Picking
j
t , with zt ∈ {E,R}.
We demean T iming and Picking, divide each by its standard deviation, and set w(R) =
0.8 > w(E) = 0.2. The specific value for w(R) − w(E) we choose is not crucial for the
results.
Subsequently, we examine whether the time-t Skill Index can predict future fund per-
formance, measured by the CAPM, three-factor, and four-factor alphas one month (and one
year) later. Table 11 shows that funds with a higher Skill Index have higher average alphas.
For example, when Skill Index is zero (its mean), the alpha is -4bp per month. However,
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when the Skill Index is one standard deviation (0.83%) above its mean, the alpha is 2.4%
(CAPM) or 1.1% (four-factor) higher per year. The three most right columns show similar
predictive power of the Skill Index for one-year ahead alphas.
As a robustness check, we construct a second skill index based on Ftiming and Fpicking
instead of T iming and Picking. A one-standard-deviation increase in this skill index in-
creases one-month-ahead alphas by 0.3-0.5% per year, a statistically significant effect.
5 Conclusion
Do investment managers add value for their clients? The answer to this question matters for
question ranging from discussions on the efficiency of markets to practical portfolio advice for
households. The large amount of randomness in financial asset returns and the unobservable
nature of risk make this a difficult question to answer. We argue that previous studies have
ignored the fact that the skill funds exhibit might change with the state of the business
cycle. When we condition on the state of the business cycle, we find that managers exhibit
stock-picking skills in booms and market-timing skills in recessions. Furthermore, we show
that this skill comes from anticipating changes in firm-specific or market fundamentals, not
from reading market sentiment, front-running the market, or using momentum strategies.
This suggests that the nature of fund managers’ skill is to conduct value-adding research
and analysis on individual firms in expansions or on the state of the aggregate economy in
recessions, and to trade on that information. Finally, we show that managers who exhibit
this time-varying skill outperform the market by 70-90 basis points per year and we identify
the observable characteristics of these managers.
Our findings raise the question, why do skilled fund managers change the nature of their
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activities over the business cycle? Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2011)
extend this research agenda by providing a theoretical answer to that question. They argue
that recessions are times when aggregate payoff shocks are more volatile and when the price
of risk is higher. Both of these forces make acquiring and processing information about
aggregate shocks more valuable. Thus, if a firm has some general cognitive ability that it
can allocate to processing information about specific stocks or to processing information
about the aggregate economy, it will optimally change the allocation between booms and
recessions. The paper lays out this theory in an equilibrium model, derives some additional
testable implications from the model and shows that those hypotheses are supported in the
data.
Like workers in all jobs, mutual fund managers can focus on different tasks at different
points in time. The task of a mutual fund manager is to uncover information. Stock-picking
and market-timing “skills” result from expending time and effort to analyze news and data.
When we re-estimate fund manager skill in a way that allows its nature to change with
economic conditions, we find evidence that skilled managers indeed readjust how they use
their skills as circumstances change. Thus, our approach uncovers new evidence in support
of the idea that a subset of managers process information about firm and economy-wide
fundamentals in a way that creates value.
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Figure 1: Market timing and stock picking, based on market and firm fundamentals.
This figure shows funds’ reliance on stock-specific information (Fpicking) and reliance on aggregate information (Ftiming) in
economic expansions (Boom) and contractions (Recession). The data are from CRSP and available monthly from January
1980 until December 2005.
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Table 1: Timing and Picking Skills are Cyclical
Dependent variables: Fund j’s Ftimingjt is defined in equation (7), where the rolling window T is 12 months
and the aggregate shock at+1 is the change in industrial production growth between t and t+ 1. A fund j’s
Fpicking
j
t is defined as in equation (8), where sit+1 is the change in asset i’s earnings growth between t and
t+ 1. T imingjt and Picking
j
t are defined in equations (1) and (2), where each stock’s βit is measured over
a twelve-month rolling window. All are multiplied by 10,000 for readability.
Independent variables: Recession is an indicator variable equal to one for every month the economy is in
a recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age in
years. Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of a fund total net assets. Expenses is the fund expense ratio.
Turnover is the fund turnover ratio. Flow is the percentage growth in a fund’s new money. Load is the total
fund load. The last three control variables measure the style of a fund along the size, value, and momentum
dimensions, calculated from the scores of the stocks in their portfolio in that month. They are omitted for
brevity. All control variables are demeaned. Flow and Turnover are winsorized at the 1% level. The data
are monthly and cover the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by fund and
time.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Timing Picking
Recession 0.140 0.139 -0.144 -0.146
(0.070) (0.068) (0.047) (0.047)
Log(Age) 0.006 0.004
(0.006) (0.004)
Log(TNA) 0.000 -0.003
(0.004) (0.003)
Expenses 1.021 -0.815
(1.280) (0.839)
Turnover 0.007 0.017
(0.013) (0.010)
Flow -0.001 0.058
(0.078) (0.088)
Load 0.033 0.156
(0.180) (0.131)
Constant 0.007 0.007 -0.010 -0.010
(0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 221,306 221,306 221,306 221,306
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Table 2: Whose skills are most cyclical?
Dependent variables: Fund j’s Ftimingjt is defined in equation (7), where the rolling window T is 12 months
and the aggregate shock at+1 is the change in industrial production growth between t and t+ 1. A fund j’s
Fpicking
j
t is defined as in equation (8), where sit+1 is the change in asset i’s earnings growth between t and
t+ 1. T imingjt and Picking
j
t are defined in equations (1) and (2), where each stock’s βit is measured over
a twelve-month rolling window. All are multiplied by 10,000 for readability.
Independent variables: Recession is an indicator variable equal to one for every month the economy is in
a recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age in
years. Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of a fund total net assets. Expenses is the fund expense ratio.
Turnover is the fund turnover ratio. Flow is the percentage growth in a fund’s new money. Load is the total
fund load. The last three control variables measure the style of a fund along the size, value, and momentum
dimensions, calculated from the scores of the stocks in their portfolio in that month. They are omitted for
brevity. All control variables are demeaned. Flow and Turnover are winsorized at the 1% level. The data
are monthly and cover the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by fund and
time.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Q50 Q75 Q95 Q50 Q75 Q95
Timing Picking
Recession 0.059 0.114 0.251 -0.084 -0.091 -0.173
(0.070) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014)
Log(Age) 0.000 -0.003 -0.020 0.003 -0.005 -0.057
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Log(TNA) 0.000 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Expenses 0.162 4.015 21.046 -0.588 3.096 18.869
(0.027) (0.178) (0.942) (0.102) (0.182) (0.941)
Turnover 0.001 0.053 0.404 0.001 0.042 0.305
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Flow 0.004 0.036 0.228 0.035 0.099 0.192
(0.002) (0.011) (0.061) (0.006) (0.012) (0.068)
Load -0.013 -0.327 -1.404 0.108 -0.129 -1.213
(0.005) (0.030) (0.166) (0.017) (0.031) (0.166)
Constant 0.000 0.108 0.765 -0.015 0.126 0.722
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 221,306 221,306 221,306 221,306 221,306 221,306
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Table 3: The Same Funds Switch Strategies
We divide all fund-month observations into Recession and Expansion subsamples. Expansion ≡ 1 −
Recession. Skill P icking is an indicator variable equal to one for all funds whose Picking measure in
Expansion is in the highest 25th percentile of the distribution, and zero otherwise. Control variables, sample
period and standard errors are described in Table 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Timing Picking
Expansion Recession Expansion Recession
Skill Picking 0.000 0.017 0.056 -0.096
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.017)
Log(Age) 0.009 -0.025 -0.001 0.029
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
Log(TNA) -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.023
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Expenses 0.868 1.374 -1.291 -4.434
(0.321) (1.032) (0.376) (1.378)
Turnover 0.009 -0.011 0.017 -0.006
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.012)
Flow 0.056 -0.876 0.138 -0.043
(0.024) (0.112) (0.037) (0.093)
Load 0.094 -0.076 0.131 0.615
(0.049) (0.151) (0.055) (0.195)
Constant 0.016 0.059 -0.021 -0.148
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
Observations 204,330 18,354 204,330 18,354
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Table 4: Timing and Picking Skills are Driven by Fundamentals
Dependent variables: Fund j’s Ftimingjt is defined in equation (7), where the rolling window T is 12 months
and the aggregate shock at+1 is the change in industrial production growth between t and t+ 1. A fund j’s
Fpicking
j
t is defined as in equation (8), where sit+1 is the change in asset i’s earnings growth between t and
t+ 1. All are multiplied by 10,000 for readability.
Independent variables: Recession is an indicator variable equal to one for every month the economy is in
a recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age in
years. Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of a fund total net assets. Expenses is the fund expense ratio.
Turnover is the fund turnover ratio. Flow is the percentage growth in a fund’s new money. Load is the total
fund load. The last three control variables measure the style of a fund along the size, value, and momentum
dimensions, calculated from the scores of the stocks in their portfolio in that month. They are omitted for
brevity. All control variables are demeaned. Flow and Turnover are winsorized at the 1% level. The data
are monthly and cover the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by fund and
time.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ftiming Fpicking
Recession 0.011 0.011 -0.682 -0.696
(0.004) (0.004) (0.159) (0.150)
Log(Age) -0.002 0.423
(0.001) (0.060)
Log(TNA) -0.001 -0.173
(0.000) (0.029)
Expenses -0.330 88.756
(0.244) (11.459)
Turnover -0.004 -0.204
(0.001) (0.053)
Flow -0.008 1.692
(0.010) (0.639)
Load 0.017 -9.644
(0.023) (1.972)
Constant -0.001 -0.001 3.084 3.086
(0.001) (0.001) (0.069) (0.070)
Observations 224,257 224,257 166,328 166,328
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Table 5: Funds Hold More Cash and Lower Portfolio Betas in Recessions
The dependent variables are three measures of funds’ cash holdings. ReportedCash is the cash position
reported by mutual funds to CRSP in their quarterly statements, relative to the size of the fund (expressed
as a percent). ImpliedCash is based on the portfolio holdings of the fund. In particular, it is the difference
between the total size of the fund (monthly) as reported in the data and the implied size of the equity
portio based on the observed holdings and their prices. It is also expressed as a percent of total holdings.
%ChangeCash is defined as the percentage change in the implied cash measure. For Equity Beta, we first
compute the market beta of each stock from a twelve-month rolling-window regression. We then construct
the funds’ equity beta as the value-weighted average of the individual stock betas, where the weights are the
fund’s dollar holdings in that stock divided by the dollar holdings in all stocks. Control variables, sample
period and standard errors are described in Table 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Implied Cash Reported Cash % Change Cash Equity Beta
Recession 2.491 3.278 0.230 0.362 0.643 0.545 -0.118 -0.106
(0.537) (0.535) (0.089) (0.087) (0.051) (0.050) (0.026) (0.027)
Log(Age) -0.453 0.309 -0.075 0.013
(0.517) (0.081) (0.037) (0.002)
Log(TNA) 1.676 -0.047 -0.092 0.008
(0.277) (0.040) (0.018) (0.001)
Expenses 163.772 -46.153 24.280 3.113
(119.092) (18.459) (6.859) (0.385)
Turnover -0.059 -0.168 0.119 0.035
(0.413) (0.064) (0.031) (0.002)
Flow 13.794 3.893 0.189 0.056
(2.840) (0.315) (0.301) (0.037)
Load -5.033 15.169 -1.144 0.561
(14.366) (2.837) (1.196) (0.062)
Constant 5.316 5.252 4.672 4.656 -1.505 -1.495 1.112 1.111
(0.481) (0.479) (0.065) (0.062) (0.033) (0.031) (0.006) (0.008)
Observations 230,185 230,185 209,516 209,516 225,374 225,374 226,094 226,094
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Table 6: Funds Change the Sector Weights in their Portfolios
The dependent variable is the portfolio weight of fund j in sector l in deviation from the market portfolio’s
weight in sector l: wjlt−w
m
lt . Each column represent a different sector. The sectors are the ten Fama-French
industry sectors: (1) Consumer non-durables, (2) Consumer durables, (3) Healthcare, (4) Manufacturing,
(5) Energy, (6) Utilities, (7) Telecom, (8) Business Equipment and Services, (9) Wholesale and Retail, (10)
Finance. Recession equals one for every month the economy is in the recession according to the NBER, and
zero otherwise. Control variables, sample period and standard errors are described in Table 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
NDRBL DRBL HLTH MFCT ENER UTIL TEL BUSEQ WHLS FIN
Recession 0.817 0.123 0.541 -0.278 -0.311 0.246 -0.493 -1.565 0.384 0.741
(0.085) (0.111) (0.215) (0.121) (0.397) (0.269) (0.111) (0.563) (0.081) (0.154)
Log(Age) 0.301 -0.022 0.728 -0.086 -0.557 -0.702 0.037 0.278 0.085 0.036
(0.028) (0.016) (0.032) (0.031) (0.044) (0.035) (0.022) (0.064) (0.027) (0.054)
Log(TNA) -0.246 -0.076 -0.387 -0.114 0.270 0.247 0.257 0.001 -0.060 -0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.016) (0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.016)
Expenses 42.310 2.132 -54.607 -72.195 67.829 28.997 22.623 -63.774 11.964 29.247
(3.641) (2.849) (4.630) (5.043) (7.958) (4.180) (3.902) (10.138) (4.611) (8.483)
Turnover -0.181 -0.134 0.330 -0.586 0.328 0.040 0.307 1.276 0.021 -1.325
(0.030) (0.025) (0.040) (0.039) (0.025) (0.017) (0.031) (0.075) (0.044) (0.041)
Flow -0.256 -0.423 -0.320 -1.241 -1.554 -1.298 1.308 3.289 0.057 0.450
(0.314) (0.296) (0.443) (0.431) (0.602) (0.503) (0.423) (1.219) (0.377) (0.580)
Load -4.833 0.764 6.123 8.589 -12.164 -9.617 3.758 23.523 -1.886 -15.841
(0.656) (0.563) (0.658) (0.894) (1.219) (0.705) (0.473) (1.729) (0.871) (0.978)
Constant -0.471 -0.777 0.173 2.499 -1.171 -1.769 -1.489 3.600 2.404 -2.660
(0.046) (0.065) (0.050) (0.073) (0.080) (0.084) (0.053) (0.201) (0.059) (0.101)
Observations 207,382 207,382 207,382 207,382 207,382 207,382 207,382 207,382 207,382 207,382
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Table 7: Managers as the Unit of Observation
The dependent variables are reliance on aggregate information (Ftiming), reliance on stock-specific infor-
mation (Fpicking), both tracked at the manager level. In columns 3 and 4, we include manager-level fixed
effects as independent variables. Control variables, sample period and standard errors are described in Table
1.
Ftiming Fpicking Ftiming Fpicking
Recession 0.008 -0.701 0.007 -0.824
(0.003) (0.130) (0.002) (0.132)
Log(Age) -0.002 0.460 -0.004 0.268
(0.001) (0.066) (0.001) (0.065)
Log(TNA) -0.000 -0.126 -0.000 -0.139
(0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.033)
Expenses 0.130 127.222 0.060 45.894
(0.105) (13.972) (0.146) (13.867)
Turnover -0.005 -0.287 -0.004 0.210
(0.002) (0.077) (0.002) (0.090)
Flow -0.009 1.037 -0.016 1.186
(0.009) (0.613) (0.009) (0.554)
Load -0.009 -16.064 -0.069 -5.832
(0.017) (2.393) (0.023) (2.307)
Manager N N Y Y
Fixed Effect
Constant -0.002 2.966 -0.002 2.977
(0.001) (0.072) (0.001) (0.068)
Observations 332,676 249,942 332,676 249,942
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Table 8: Alternative Measures of Skill
The dependent variables are funds’ reliance on aggregate information Ftiming2, funds’ reliance on stock-
specific information Fpicking2, and the CAPM R − squared. A fund j’s Ftiming2jt is defined as the
(twelve-month rolling window time series) covariance between the funds’ portfolio holdings in deviation from
the market (wjit−w
m
it ) in month t and changes in non-farm employment growth between t and t+1. A fund
j’s Fpicking2jt is defined as the (across stock) covariance between the funds’ holdings in deviation from the
market (wjit − w
m
it ) in month t and changes in earnings growth between t − 11 and t + 1. R − squared is
obtained from the twelve-month rolling-window regression model of a fund’s excess returns on excess market
returns. Ftiming2, and Fpicking2 are multiplied by 10,000 and R − squared is multiplied by 100 for ease
of readability. Control variables, sample period and standard errors are described in Table 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ftiming2 Fpicking2 R-squared
Recession 0.004 0.004 -0.886 -0.897 3.040 2.891
(0.001) (0.001) (0.201) (0.191) (1.451) (1.315)
Log(Age) -0.001 0.452 2.126
(0.000) (0.076) (0.190)
Log(TNA) 0.000 -0.229 0.258
(0.000) (0.034) (0.074)
Expenses -0.158 111.982 -582.087
(0.058) (12.954) (26.684)
Turnover 0.000 -0.329 -1.242
(0.000) (0.074) (0.110)
Flow -0.001 2.570 -6.614
(0.003) (0.723) (2.885)
Load 0.021 -12.614 68.883
(0.007) (2.317) (5.434)
Constant -0.001 -0.001 3.962 3.962 77.361 77.331
(0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.089) (0.854) (0.846)
Observations 224,257 224,257 166,328 166,328 227,159 227,159
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Table 9: Strategy Switchers Outperform
The dependent variables CAPM alpha, three-factor alpha, and four-factor alpha are obtained from a twelve-
month rolling-window regression of a fund’s excess returns, before expenses, on a set of common risk factors.
Skill P icking is an indicator variable equal to one for all funds whose Picking measure in Expansion is in
the highest 25th percentile of the distribution, and zero otherwise. Control variables, sample period and
standard errors are described in Table 1.
(1) (2) (3)
CAPM Alpha 3-Factor Alpha 4-Factor Alpha
Skill Picking 0.076 0.056 0.064
(0.040) (0.021) (0.018)
Log(Age) -0.039 -0.028 -0.038
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(TNA) 0.032 0.013 0.014
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Expenses 4.956 0.627 0.241
(1.066) (0.793) (0.739)
Turnover -0.009 -0.047 -0.041
(0.014) (0.012) (0.009)
Flow 2.579 1.754 1.602
(0.173) (0.102) (0.101)
Load -0.744 -0.090 -0.289
(0.214) (0.136) (0.145)
Constant 0.057 0.038 0.049
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018)
Observations 227,183 227,183 227,183
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Table 10: Comparing “Skill-Picking” Funds to Other Funds
We divide all fund-month observations into Recession and Expansion subsamples. Expansion equals one
every month the economy is not in recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. Skill P icking is
one for any fund with a Picking measure (defined in Table 1) in the highest 25th percentile in expansions,
and zero otherwise. Panel A reports fund-level characteristics. Age, TNA, Expenses, Turnover, Flow and
Ftiming are defined in Table 1. Portfoliodispersion is the concentration of the fund’s portfolio, measured as
the Herfindahl index of portfolio weights in deviation from the market portfolio’s weights. Stock Number is
the number of stocks in the fund’s portfolio. Industry is the industry concentration of the fund’s portfolio,
measured as the Herfindahl index of portfolio weights in a given industry in deviation from the market
portfolio’s weights. Beta Deviation is the absolute difference between the fund’s beta and the average beta
in its style category. Panel B reports manager-level characteristics. MBA or Ivy equals one if the manager
obtained an MBA degree or graduated from an Ivy League institution, and equals zero otherwise. Age and
Experience are the fund manager’s age and experience in years. Gender equals one if the manager is a
male and zero if female. Hedge Fund equals one if the manager ever departed to a hedge fund, and zero
otherwise. SP1 − SP0 is the difference between the mean values of the groups for which Skill P icking
equals one and zero, respectively. p− values measure statistical significance of the difference. The data are
monthly from 1980-2005.
Skill Picking = 1 Skill Picking = 0 Difference
Mean Stdev. Median Mean Stdev. Median SP1-SP0 p-value
Panel A: Fund Characteristics
Age 10.01 8.91 7 15.20 15.34 9 -5.19 0.000
TNA 621.13 2027.04 129.60 1019.45 4024.29 162.90 -398.32 0.002
Expenses 1.48 0.47 1.42 1.22 0.47 1.17 0.26 0.000
Turnover 130.41 166.44 101.00 79.89 116.02 58.00 50.52 0.000
Flow 0.22 7.39 -0.76 -0.07 6.47 -0.73 0.300 0.008
Portfolio dispersion 1.68 1.60 1.29 1.33 1.50 0.99 0.35 0.000
Stock Number 90.83 110.20 68 111.86 187.13 69 -21.03 0.000
Industry 8.49 7.90 6.39 5.37 7.54 3.54 3.12 0.000
Beta Deviation 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.10 0.05 0.000
Ftiming 4.13 5.93 1.82 2.77 3.97 1.26 1.37 0.000
Panel B: Fund Manager Characteristics
MBA 42.09 49.37 0 39.49 48.88 0 2.60 0.128
Ivy 25.36 43.51 0 27.94 44.87 0 -2.57 0.205
Age 53.02 10.42 50 54.11 10.06 52 -1.08 0.081
Experience 26.45 10.01 24 28.14 10.00 26 -1.69 0.003
Gender 90.89 28.77 100 90.50 29.31 100 0.39 0.681
Hedge Fund 10.43 30.57 0 6.12 23.96 0 4.31 0.000
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Table 11: Skill Index Predicts Performance
The dependent variable is the fund’s cumulative CAPM, three-factor, or four-factor alpha, calculated from
a twelve-month rolling regression of observations in month t + 2 in the three left columns and in month
t + 13 in the three most right columns. For each fund, we form the following skill index in month t.
Skill Index
j
t = w(zt)T iming
j
t + (1 − w(zt))Picking
j
t , zt ∈ {Expansion,Recession}, w(Recession)=0.8 >
w(Expansion) = 0.2. Picking and T iming are defined in Table 1, except that now they are normalized so
that they are mean zero and have a standard deviation of one over the full sample. The other right-hand
side variables, the sample period, and the standard error calculation are the same as in Table 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One Month Ahead One Year Ahead
CAPM Alpha 3-Factor Alpha 4-Factor Alpha CAPM Alpha 3-Factor Alpha 4-Factor Alpha
Skill Index 0.239 0.118 0.107 0.224 0.104 0.106
(0.044) (0.022) (0.019) (0.031) (0.025) (0.014)
Log(Age) -0.034 -0.024 -0.036 -0.019 -0.009 -0.024
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Log(TNA) 0.026 0.010 0.011 -0.016 -0.018 -0.011
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Expenses -2.977 -7.063 -7.340 -5.793 -9.093 -9.308
(1.620) (1.004) (0.957) (1.578) (0.917) (0.887)
Turnover -0.010 -0.047 -0.039 -0.001 -0.041 -0.036
(0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010)
Flow 2.409 1.664 1.519 0.237 0.210 0.227
(0.151) (0.097) (0.095) (0.119) (0.086) (0.071)
Load -0.762 -0.093 -0.313 -0.683 0.213 -0.044
(0.233) (0.144) (0.157) (0.225) (0.129) (0.149)
Constant -0.030 -0.055 -0.041 -0.043 -0.070 -0.056
(0.024) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022)
Observations 219,338 219,338 219,338 187,668 187,668 187,668
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